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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the change in the relationships between small and private business
borrowers and their lenders during the 2020 COVID pandemic. Nationwide government
mandated closures changed consumer patterns as well as the cash flow to small and private
businesses. Limited cash flows threatened the access to credit for these businesses and the
expected outcome of the resulting covenant violations was catastrophic. After surveying nine
high ranking credit officers from lenders of various sizes and geographic locations, it was clear
that lenders maintained these small and private businesses’ lines of credit through
accommodations, mainly payment deferral programs and waived covenants. Results indicated
lenders used various thresholds for offering accommodations and associated costs. However,
every lender, independent of their size, asset class, and geographical characteristics, was willing
to work with their small and private business borrowers to help them survive the challenges of
the pandemic.
Key Words: covenant, breach, lender, asset, COVID-19, payment deferral programs, credit,
private borrowers, accommodations, government intervention
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID pandemic created a unique economic distress situation. Unlike the most
recent financial disaster in 2008, the economic shock directly affected the real economy: normal
business functions halted, consumption patterns changed, and employment levels plummeted.
Following the government mandated closures of businesses around the country, cash flow
disappeared for many companies initiating mass panic in the debt and equity markets. Banks and
other creditors feared the loss of cash flows for many sectors of the economy would lead to
severe losses, excess loan foreclosures, and an influx of bankruptcy filings. Widespread breaches
in covenants and consequential loan delinquencies were expected to instigate the anticipated
chaos within capital markets and the general economy.
The government and the Federal Reserve had no choice but to intervene and release
liquidity in the market to restore confidence to the real economy. Similar to the 2008 financial
crisis, the Fed promised to keep interest rates low and buy back appropriate assets to maintain
liquidity in the capital markets. However, with the uniqueness of the situation, the government
experimented with new tools to place the money directly to businesses in need with Paycheck
Protection Program loans. These actions created an opportunity for cooperation between
qualifying lenders and borrowers. Instead of foreclosing loans, amendments, deferrals, and
waivers were granted to keep businesses afloat.
The novelty of the economic crisis spurred many scholars and experts to explore the
changes in the credit market during COVID-19 and the government’s interventions to provide
relief across the supply chain of credit. Despite the attention to the phenomenon, the small,
private business credit market has been relatively ignored creating an important gap in the area
of research. When states required companies to close their doors, the most affected group of
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businesses were small, local, and regional firms. In an article by Forbes released shortly after the
start of the pandemic, three in four small businesses reported they were concerned with the
economic impact on their businesses and 38% were not confident about their financial future
(Hannon). Larger, national firms were also concerned with the impact of COVID; however,
many had more access to credit options and could adapt more easily to the changing customer
environment (COVID-19). Small businesses were not as fortunate. Overnight, revenue streams
plummeted, and small, private businesses did not have the capabilities to combat these losses on
their own.
Small businesses produce approximately 50% of the GDP and employment in the United
States. With COVID threatening a large portion of these businesses, gaining insight into this
market will help to understand the lasting impact of the pandemic. For small businesses, loans
are often the only source of capital. The general trend in the private market correlates the selfownership and risk characterizing small and private businesses with a higher number of
covenants (Berger and Udell 2003). There are more restrictions on these businesses’ activities
lowering the threshold for breaches. These breaches have the potential to completely cut off
these businesses' source of credit and force them to close their doors. Ultimately, the
consequences could lead to a significant decline in GDP. Studying covenant resolutions and the
cooperation within lender and borrower relationships can reveal information that has largely
escaped academic commentary.
This paper will explore how the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting government
intervention has affected the relationship between creditors and small and private business
borrowers regarding covenant violations and accommodations. Using survey data from lenders
ranging from less than $5bn to above $500bn in total assets, the paper will discuss 1) How did
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lenders address payment defaults and covenant violation accommodation requests? and, 2) What
were the costs of these accommodations? The results identified key trends in lender’s approach
to accommodations as well as differences due to total asset size and asset class. Specifically, the
surveys revealed that with the overall regulatory leniency over credit risk, lenders of various
sizes, asset classes, and geographical areas were willing to work alongside their borrowers
through the pandemic. Small, local, and regional lenders were more likely to freely offer
accommodations to their borrower portfolios. Larger national lenders were more likely to look at
characteristics of the borrower before making accommodations and leniently adjusted the terms
of the loan to better match the credit risk of the company. Lenders that service unique asset
classes, specifically short-term cash loans and commodities, used more in-depth due diligence
methodologies to determine which borrowers were more likely to survive COVID and therefore
required appropriate accommodations. The survey results ultimately highlighted the deviation
from the typical treatment of covenant violation seen in normal economic conditions as well as
previous economic distress environments.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Debt covenants are vital in providing creditor’s confidence when issuing a loan. They can
prohibit or limit activities of a business to maintain an expected level of performance from the
debtor. The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a unique economic backdrop to study covenant
breach resolution. To fully grasp the contextual landscape of covenants, it is critical to look at the
literature focused on their significance in the credit markets and trends during financial distress.
Additionally, for the purpose of this study, it is essential to explore the split between loan
covenant treatment for large and small businesses in public and private markets. This section will
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discuss the theories of these three areas to create a foundation necessary to explore the new
lender and borrower relationships that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The protection of the debt covenant arose from the conflict of interest between firm
managers, debtholders, and shareholders. By understanding these conflicts, scholars have
developed a central theory called the Agency Theory of Covenants (ATC) that justifies the need
for covenants in the credit markets.
To understand the theory, it is essential to examine the relationship nature of the conflicts
between managers-shareholders and shareholders-debtholders. ATC is grounded in the idea of
agency’s costs within a firm. This relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their
behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent'' (Jenkins and
Meckling 1976, 308). In the case of a corporation, the management team has a contract to make
decisions on behalf of the shareholders. These relationships come at a cost to align the interests
of shareholders with the actions of management.
The added layer of debtholders within the capital structure of the corporation forces
management to mitigate the additional conflicting interests between its shareholders and its
debtholders. Clifford Smith and Jerold Warner (1979) found that there were four major sources
of these conflicts in which management favors the shareholder’s interest over the debtholders
due to their agency relationship. These sources include dividend payments, claim dilution of debt
holders, asset substitutions, and underinvestment in projects that could potentially add value only
to the debtholders (Smith et al. 1979). These “conflict[s] results in actions undertaken by
managers acting on behalf of shareholders that have a negative impact on the value of the firm's
outstanding debt as well as the total value of the firm” (Bradley and Roberts 2015, 2). The ATC
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states that covenants can help to balance these complex, conflicting interests by restricting
management’s decision-making abilities to balance debtholder and shareholder needs.
The ATC is based on the costly contracting hypothesis, that by managing the
shareholder-debtholder conflict, the value of a firm can increase. The hypothesis asserts that
covenants can reduce the opportunity loss when management prioritizes the shareholder over the
debtholders and lowers the cost of monitoring management for debtholders (Smith et al. 1979,
121). Bradley and Roberts’ (2015) study found covenants reduce agency costs leading to a lower
cost of debt. The reduced cost offsets the extra cost of covenants to the firm. “As long as the
costs of the constraints imposed by the covenants are less than the increase in the proceeds of the
issue, firms will include covenants in their debt contracts” (Bradley et al. 2015, 4). This theory
holds true in all markets.
The variance of these effects due to sizes and disclosure requirements of business are
regularly explored by scholars. It is uncontested that there is a positive linear correlation between
covenants and a businesses’ growth rate and risk level. As predicted by the ATC, most scholars
have found that high risk businesses benefit the most from covenants. These differences can be
found when dividing the credit markets into two dimensions: public and private markets and the
size of the business.
With the available information, scholars have found trends in the private market that
mirror the ATC predictions. Private businesses have more cost when it comes to the “screening,
contracting, and monitoring” necessary for a loan and do not have the agency costs of public
businesses as they are self-owned (Berger and Udell 1998). Since there are no agency costs
between managers and shareholders, managers are more inclined to offload risk on the lender
(Berger and Udell 2003). Covenants offer a more significant decrease in agency costs for the
7

lender and are more prevalent in the private market. A study done in Australia, analyzing the
differences between debt covenants in private and public contracts, revealed more restrictive
covenants are better suited for private market loans that are more diverse and volatile (Mather
and Graham 2006). Another study done by Kahn and Tuckman (1993) revealed private
placement covenants were found to “more aggressively control the actions of equity
holders…and allow lenders to monitor businesses easier.” The distinction between public and
private businesses illustrates the different treatments of businesses with different ownership
structures. Specifically, lenders benefit from aggressive use of covenants in the private market.
Business size also affects lenders use of covenants due to credit availability and general
risk of the loan. Larger banks are not as suited to make loans to small businesses; their
centralized decision-making structure gives them a disadvantage in the monitoring costs for
small businesses (Berger and Kashyap and Scalise 1995). This inherently limits the pool of
lenders for these businesses. DeYoung, Goldberg and White (1999) further explored this
relationship and found a negative correlation between bank size, age and loans to small
businesses. With limited sources of funds, it is unsurprising that these businesses are treated
differently when it comes to covenants. Bathala, Bowlin, and Dukes (2006) conducted a study
that showed most covenants imposed on small businesses were from banks and tended to be
positive covenants, meaning the covenants required these businesses to meet certain performance
measures. There is also a positive correlation between covenants and debt levels, cost of
borrowing and the security of a bank (DeYoung et al. 1999). With limited access to credit
through larger banks, small businesses are at an inherent disadvantage. These businesses are
more subjected to less secure loans and higher costs of borrowing. Therefore, they are more
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likely to have greater exposure to covenant breaches and are at an extreme disadvantage when
the financial environment prevents them from meeting their required performance metrics.
Finally, it is important to look at the debt covenant market during times of distress. After
banks violate a covenant, businesses adjust their decision-making process due to changes in their
debt structure. Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito and Perez found violations of covenants usually lead
to raised spreads, shortened maturity, tighter covenants, and reduction of the size of credit. These
effects are exaggerated when banks are financially unhealthy and tend to increase after a
financial crisis (Acharya et al. 2014). Business activity also changes after credit violations;
specifically, changes in agreements affect a business’s investment and financing behavior
(Roberts and Chava 2008). Investments are expected to decrease, and a company’s financing
options are expected to contract due to past performance. These companies are more likely to be
classified as a “risky” investment. Additionally, Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012) found that after a
credit violation there is a decline in capital expenditures, leverage, and shareholder payouts along
with an increase in CEO turnover. The study also concluded that there were stronger restrictions
on management’s decision-making capabilities (Nini et al. 2012). Breaching a covenant has
important implications for businesses in the short and long term. The impact can be felt by all
shareholders and can permanently affect the growth trajectory of the business.
The ATC theory explains why covenants are often used within the credit market and
helps to identify the trends seen in various market structures and financial situations. The
COVID pandemic has provided a landscape unlike any seen in the last century. The theories and
outcomes of covenant breaches explored by the academic community demonstrates the severity
of the current financial crisis. The literature confirms that small, private businesses are at greater
risk for covenant breaches and are more likely to have the greatest consequences. However, with
9

the general effects of the pandemic and the interference of the government and the Federal
Reserve, these trends related to the ATC theory may not apply.
RESEARCH AND DATA
I began with a sample of 70 banks and lending platforms as sources of contact to gather
data using a questionnaire. Admittedly, the sample offering was not random due to information
barriers. The nature of the research and data gathering technique required direct access to
members of the private credit lending branch from each bank. This requirement narrowed sample
options considerably. To accomplish a well-rounded sample given the research barriers,
resources available as a Wharton Undergraduate student were utilized. These sources included
contact information found through alumni connections and PitchBook. However, with further
analysis of the characteristics of the sample, it is evident the sample provides a diverse
population representative of the banks and lending platforms that typically lend to small and
private businesses.
Two key characteristics were used to determine the fitness of the sample: the size of the
assets and the location of the bank. After searching for providers of small and private businesses,
it was evident the population includes very small local lenders, small regional lenders and larger
national and multi-regional lenders. The sample represents every aspect of this population as
seen in the table below.
Table 1. Total Sample Population by Asset Class
Total Asset Size:
Very Small (x >$5 bn)
Small ($5< x <$100 bn)
Medium ($100< x <$500bn)
Large (x >500bn)

Number of Lenders:
20
34
8
7
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The sample consisted of a wide range of lender sizes with a high concentration of smaller lenders
with total assets below $100 bn. As mentioned, local lenders are better equipped to monitor these
higher risk businesses and therefore the concentration of smaller lenders within the sample is
justified. The inclusion of large and medium lenders encompasses the representation of these
lenders as the large volume providers of small and private business loans. With the distribution
of total assets of these lenders, the sample distribution matches the expected population of credit
providers.
The location of the bank was also essential in determining the suitability of the sample.
Due to the pattern of the closures throughout the country, the sample population needed to
represent a diverse geographical population to capture the various effects of COVID throughout
the country. When closures began, one of the most impacted areas was the East Coast while the
South had limited closures and less exposure to the crisis impact. To ensure the representation of
the various economic scenarios, the sample needed to include lenders from various regions to
capture the total impact of COVID on credit relationships. The table below accounts for the
number of lenders that cater to each region with some lenders catering to more than one region.
Table 2. Total Sample Population by Geographical Region
Regions:
East Coast
West Coast
Mid-West
South

Number of Lenders:
42
25
28
25
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As shown in the table, the sample population has a relatively equal representation amongst the
various regions of the United States. Insight into the various treatment of borrowers throughout
the country is instrumental in identifying the impact of COVID on the small and private business
credit industry. The sample, therefore, encompasses the appropriate access to information to
identify overall trends in changes in behavior in credit relationships.
Using this sample of banks and lending platforms, surveys were sent to each lender’s
highest ranking credit officer. The survey was conducted through email or phone interviews.
These surveys focused on three main topics including: the overall impression of lenders in the
changing relationship between lenders and borrowers and subsequently the government, the
characteristics of businesses that were given accommodations, and the types of accommodations
with the resulting costs. Due to the sensitive nature of numeric data from these sources, many of
the questions were phased to extract tangible and comparable answers through a yes/no structure
as seen in the table below.
Figure 1. Survey Questions
Was there a cohesive leniency throughout the supply chain of
capital?
Did the industry matter?
Did the size of the company matter? Size of the loan?
Did the size of the revenue shock to the industry matter?
Did the location/regionality matter?
Did the fact they received PPP make a difference?
Compared to normal times, were accommodation for covenant
renegotiation needed or sought after more frequently?
Were accommodations granted?
Was a fee included in these accommodations?

These questions helped identify several tangible trends from responses regarding the general
characteristics of changing behaviors between lenders and borrowers. In addition to these
12

questions, the survey included several open-ended questions for credit experts to explain their
overall impression of these changes within the industry during COVID, how they compare to
normal times and other financial crises, and the potential expiration date of these changes.
After sending out the surveys, a conservative response rate of 10-15% was expected from the
initial sample due to the nature of the requested data. Many companies would most likely be
unwilling to divulge sensitive information on their relationships with their borrowers. Consistent
with expectations, there was a 12.9% response rate from the original sample.
Using the same two criteria, geographical regions and size of the lender, to determine the
soundness of the data ensured properly drawn conclusions from these responses. As shown in the
table below which accounts for the location each lender, the responding lenders were almost
evenly spread across the nation.
Table 3. Respondent Population by Asset Class
Regions:
East Coast
West Coast
Mid-West
South

Number of Lenders:
5
5
6
4

The equal representation ensures the reported results of the survey had limited location bias and
captured a population exposed to the various degrees of COVID effects throughout the nation.
The responding population allows identified trends concerning the changing behavior between
lenders and borrowers to be applied on a national level.
Additionally, the distribution of bank size of the respondents mirrored the overall
population of participants originally identified. A higher concentration of the responders fell into
13

the “small and very small” lender categories and several responders fell into the “large and
medium” lender categories.
Table 4. Respondent Population by Geographical Region
Total Asset Size:
Very Small (x >$5 bn)
Small ($5< x <$100 bn)
Medium ($100< x <$500bn)
Large (x >$500bn)

Number of Lenders:
2
5
1
1

With the available data and means of collecting my sample populations, biases were
unavoidable. First, as expected with survey driven data, the sample contains non-response bias as
the respondents were willing participants. With this type of information, there was a greater
likelihood that lenders with successful systems of accommodating their borrower portfolios were
more likely to respond to the survey. Lenders that struggled with their borrower relationships and
ended up with higher levels of defaulted loans would be less likely to respond to the survey.
Additionally, due to the sensitivity of the overall data and information it may have been difficult
for the company’s legal team to approve any commentary further limiting the pool of willing
participants. These biases were expected and therefore need to be taken into account in the
results.
RESULTS
With the limited sample size, it is necessary to note some concern on the reliability of
statistically significant conclusions for the population. However, with the resulting data, several
important trends can be identified with respect to the process of granting accommodations for
covenant violations and the resulting costs. Through the information received, general patterns
were identified with yes/no responses from survey participants concerning tangible
14

characteristics of what accommodations were given as well as which borrowers were most likely
to receive this cooperation. Trends were also identified using key population characteristics
described in the methodology. With the additional information provided by the surveys, the
paper discusses the behavior between lenders and their borrowers within various asset classes.
Finally, the impact of the government intervention on the cooperation between lenders and
borrowers and how it compares to the 2008 crisis will be addressed.
Expectations and Typical Borrower Treatment
In the typical situation, the covenant breach is a trigger to discuss waivers and new terms
if the borrower’s distress situation is temporary. However, if the situation was not temporary or
there is a payment default, the lender is unlikely to waive covenants and negotiate for new terms
with the violating business. Still, it is difficult to foreclose a loan without payment defaults and
non-performing status. The insight from the survey was consistent with previous literature on
covenants and covenant violations within the small and private business credit industry.
Violations usually lead to waivers that included fees, increased interest rates, and higher
collateral requirements to account for the added risk the lender takes on with these
accommodations. Consequently, the businesses that are given accommodations have larger
burdens through increased fees and payments to account for their covenant violations.
According to these ‘normal times’ practices and the previous literature regarding
covenant violations and consequences, the expectations for the COVID crisis were catastrophic.
With business closures, almost all failing businesses that requested accommodations were unable
to make principal and even interest payments during the first few months of the crisis. These
payment defaults should have been met with foreclosed loans and tighter liquidity terms due to
the added risks to the lenders. However, as one response indicated ‘accelerating the loan might
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be the worst thing you can do- as long as it’s not bad business judgement’. The general results
from the survey suggest that lenders did not take the expected actions characterizing typical
covenant breaches and payment defaults. Instead, lenders worked with the borrowers to provide
them non-consequential relief through payment deferral plans and covenant waivers.
Survey Results
Figure 2. Survey Responses
Question
Was there a cohesive leniency throughout the supply chain of
capital?
Did the industry matter?
Did the size of the company matter? Size of the loan?
Did the size of the revenue shock to the industry matter?
Did the location/regionality matter?
Did the fact they received PPP make a difference?
Compared to normal times, were accommodation for covenant
renegotiation needed or sought after more frequently?
Were accommodations granted?
Was a fee included in these accommodations?

YES
9

NO
0

5
5
5
4
6
8

4
4
4
5
3
1

9
3

0
6

As expected, almost every response indicated that the frequency of accommodations
needed from borrowers increased during the COVID crisis. With the exception of one lender, all
the responding lenders found that a greater portion of their loan portfolios required waivers and
deferrals to survive due to rapidly decreasing cash flows to small and private businesses. For two
of these lenders, almost half of their portfolios filed requests for accommodations. Other lenders
had smaller portions of their portfolios exposed to the risks of COVID, while the only response
that indicated no change in this frequency was in the commodities business. This exception
within the sample implies that the industry and asset class of the typical borrower of the lender
did affect the overall need for accommodations. These effects will be discussed in a later section.
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The most consistent answer among the responding lenders was that COVID created the
opportunity for leniency throughout the supply chain of capital. From the survey results, the
government’s behavior was characterized as a general shift towards forgiveness and leniency
while monitoring the credit risk of loans to businesses. Small and private businesses affected by
COVID were likely to drop in their credit ratings; they were not able to make payments without
any cash flow. In normal times, lenders, specifically monitored banks, would be required to label
these non-performing loans as TDRs or a troubled debt restriction. This indication requires the
bank to mark the loan down to its collateral value and report the losses on its regulatory filings.
However, in general, regulators allowed banks to defer clients up to six months without
transferring these loans to TDRs on their balance sheet. This leniency from regulators was the
turning point in the general trend towards broader cooperation between lenders and their
borrowers. Banks were able to maintain their required capital and risk ratios instead of
foreclosing on loans that were only considered nonperforming due to extraneous circumstances.
This maintained the balance needed for banks to continue lending and addressing the needs of
the small and private business without a liquidity freeze from regulatory scrutiny.
As a direct result from this leniency, overall, the characteristics of businesses receiving
accommodations was determined by their needs and in some cases, industry and location. From
the five responses that suggested that business characteristics, the industry and region of the
business, did not matter, the needs of their borrower base tended to span a wider breath of the
portfolio and therefore, did not require attention to these items. These accommodations were
given more liberally due to the changes made to the overall structure of the lenders. Responders
who reported these business characteristics were unimportant, were able to step up new structural
systems to quickly service accommodations and monitor the risk of these accommodations
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smoothly. For the four lenders in which the characteristics of the businesses did matter,
accommodations were only given on a case-by-case basis. Respondents consistently claimed that
accommodations requested and given were only to businesses within industries that were greatly
affected by COVID. Typically, these lender’s responses indicated that a small portion of their
portfolios were affected by COVID and therefore did not adopt the ‘open’ accommodation
policies of more affected lenders when assisting their borrowers.
PPP loans also played an important role in the process of granting accommodations and
saving small and private businesses from loan foreclosures. All the responding lenders agreed
that PPP loans increased the confidence of the lender in the borrower’s ability to overcome the
challenges of COVID. Six out of the nine lenders indicated that these PPP loans increased the
probably of receiving accommodations. These lenders were typically more stringent with their
handouts. The three respondents who indicated the PPP loans were not essential for receiving
additional assistance were the lenders who were very lenient in giving out accommodations.
Overall, the impression of PPP was positive among all responders. Lenders perceived these loans
as another instrumental government program that helped small and private businesses overcome
the COVID crisis. It provided them with extra cash to make payments and increase lender
confidence in their future recovery.
Accommodations varied between the responses. The most consistent changes to contracts
reported were deferrals of both interest and principal payments on preexisting loans. Typically,
these missed payments were added onto the final months of payments or the payments were
added to the end of the term contract extending the maturity to match the deferral period. These
maturity extensions were more common with the “small and very small” lenders that served
more local populations. The larger lenders did offer accommodations and deferrals; however,
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they were less willing to extend the overall maturity of the loan to accommodate the missed
payments. Instead, payments were spread out over the last few months of payment on the loans.
The cost of these accommodations also varied across responses. Although every lender
explicitly stated that they did not take advantage of the larger inflex of accommodations requests
to charge fees or penalties, three lenders did have costs associated with these changes made.
These additional costs consisted of a small increase in interest rates to account for the added risk
of the loan. The remaining six responses specified that no costs were associated with these
accommodations for the duration of the pandemic’s effects on the business. From all responses,
it was clear that, compared to typical times, costs and fees were significantly more lenient. A
typical covenant violation ensures penalty fees, requires fees to renegotiate the contract, and
likely leads to an increase the interest rates charged due to the added risk of the borrower. From
the results, it seems most lenders were more concerned with allowing these businesses to
overcome the challenges of COVID without any added stress of the typical penalties.
Overall, the relationship between the lenders and their borrowers, despite the
characteristics of the lenders, was more lenient and cooperative. The government leniency
towards these accommodations and new standards during COIVD made these changing
relationships possible.
Geographical and Size Analysis
As indicated in the methodology, the geographical location and the size of the bank
helped to determine the overall reliability of the sample population. With a respondent sample
size of nine lenders, it is difficult to make any conclusions with certainty on the overall trends
within each region and lender size. However, some conclusions described in the previous section
can be linked to these various sample population characteristics.
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Looking at these characteristics, the lenders were split into two sub sections to identify
patterns. The first group included five regional lenders all had assets qualified as “small to very
small” lenders. These lenders located in the Mid-West, South, and the West were relatively
liberal with their thresholds for receiving extra accommodations; they all choose to
accommodate any borrower that was in need due to COVID and did not discriminate based on
the business characteristics. The only small lender in the east coast region that exclusively lent to
commodity businesses did not follow the same pattern. This lender was less affected by COVID
and therefore does not accurately depict a conclusive pattern for the region. Apart from the
commodities lender, none of these lenders charged borrowers for the accommodations. Overall,
it was difficult to pinpoint geographical trends, however, using the category of size, it was clear
that smaller lenders were more likely to offer accommodations freely and without extra costs.
The second group of lenders were comprised of four national lenders that fell into the
“medium and large” lenders for their total asset sizes. Typically, these national lenders provided
their businesses with accommodation but took a more case-by-case approach for each of their
borrowers. Two out of the three lenders in this category charged small fees for these
accommodations. All lenders considered characteristics of the borrower when deciding the
accommodations plan going forward. These consistent trends in response indicated lenders
consistently treated their borrower different than the small regional lenders.
The responses indicated that, overall, lenders of all sizes that serviced various regions of
the country consistently focused on creating an environment of accommodations based on the
various needs of their portfolio. Smaller, regional, and local lenders tend to focus on meeting
every need and providing these accommodations without fees. Larger lenders were focused on
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meeting the needs of businesses severely affected by COVID and were more likely to adjust for
the added risk of taking on these deferred loans.
Asset Class Analysis
The collection of responses highlighted key trends throughout different asset classes and
industries. Some of the responding lenders lent to a broad range of small and private businesses
with typical commercial loan structures while other lenders specialized in short term loans and
commodities. The range of response explored the nuances in treatments across lenders and assets
during the COVID crisis.
The typical term and revolver loans made to small and private businesses around the
country were treated differently across lenders. As discussed in the previous section, the overall
responses of the lenders were synchronized in allowing their borrowers the best opportunities to
make it through COVID challenges. However, after speaking with several different lenders, it
was clear that everyone had their own system and strategies to offer help to their borrowers in
need. Several lenders completely changed the structure of their workflow to accompany the
growing needs for accommodations and PPP loans.
One responding lender became a twenty-four-hour service for accommodations and PPP
loans to their local borrower populations. The lender was able to create a system of due diligence
and approvals for each business that was possible to complete within four to six hours of
receiving the request for the accommodation. These approvals allowed for case-by-case deferrals
for 60-to-90-day periods depending on the needs of the business. The system was only possible
due to the government’s leniency in risk monitoring for these deferrals. The responder indicated
that the typical time for due diligence without the government intervention was three to five
days. Expediting the timeline allowed the lender to quickly get the companies in their portfolio
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the relief they needed. In addition to this system, the lender was also able to create a system for
PPP loan approvals. In a few hours, a company could easily qualify and receive the cash loan
from the program. With the efficiency dynamic at the lender, borrower’s needs were met quickly
and easily and allowed the bank to successfully get these borrowers the relief they needed in a
timely manner.
Another responder took a more long-term approach. First, their process required them to
make decisions about borrowers who could and could not make it through their expected 12month recovery period. Loans that did not have any tangible assets or collateral were sold off.
Then, the lender split the business into twelve distinct risk groups based on the industry and the
size of the business to handle requests for accommodations. These accommodations were made
on a six-to-twelve-month basis as a payment plan. The payment contract was negotiated based
on the risk group to meet the needs of each business and maintain the appropriate risk taken by
the lender. Participating companies were typically backed by sponsors allowing them to provide
cash collateral to the negotiations to allow for the more long-term flexibility. Through this
twelve-month period, the business had to provide a strategy focused on cutting costs to manage
the liquidity they planned to burn through in the first few months of the pandemic. Every month
the company and its industry were monitored; once a company or the industry returned to
normalcy, the borrower was taken off the list of “payment plans”. If the borrower was unable to
return to normal operational performance at the same time as the industry, they were labeled a
non-performing loan. Finally, after being taken off the “payment plan list”, their payment
contract covenants were viewed from that month on instead of a twelve-month rolling period.
This allowed the monitoring system to skip over the period of covenant non-compliance and
rebuild a twelve-month period of compliance.
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Finally, one responder had an overwhelming focus on getting their borrower portfolio
PPP loans by working directly with the SBA. It was clear that these PPP loans were meant to
help relieve any issues with borrowers’ ability to pay debt payments during the pandemic. The
lender itself restructured to meet its high level of demand for these PPP loans. In return, the high
outflow of these loans helped hard hit businesses significantly and reduced the severity of
accommodations required to make it through the pandemic. In addition to these loans, the
responder worked closely with their borrowers to make other accommodations or offer other
products in the market. Similar to other lenders mainly servicing small businesses, these
accommodations included waived or reversed fees and/or interest payment increases, deferred
payments and even emergency credit lines.
The most unique situation reported was in the FinTech industry, specifically short-term
cash loans. These loans were unique as they require daily or weekly payments from businesses
that are extremely reliant on daily cash from their customers. The most common customers of
these loans are restaurants and other small cash businesses highly reliant on customer foot traffic.
Unlike the other responses I received, these lending platforms had various ranges of successes
due to their supply chain of credit. Many of these companies received lending from banks.
Lending platforms without diverse customers were immediately cut off from their sources of
credit. They instantly cut off their customers from cash and liquidate the available assets of their
borrowers. These lenders were forced to mark down almost all their loans and their remaining
business was sold off to third parties. These lending platforms were high risk and not necessarily
protected by the regulatory leniency granted to other responding lenders. If the lending platform
did not have diversified and permanent capital, then they ended up failing and cutting off their
loans to their small and private business borrowers.
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However, some lending platforms with access to the permanent capital necessary to
continue lending were able to survive. These lenders utilized their access to data and algorithms
to choose the companies they supported through the pandemic. The characteristics of a business
were essential in making any accommodations; the lenders utilized their data on credit card
receipts and regional news to see how long the shock to revenues would last and how the
business was fairing during closures. Unlike the other lender responses, one of the most
important factors in making these decisions were previous relationships. Having a prior
relationship with consistently successful payment logs helped the lender confidently choose
which businesses would most likely recover from the closures and COVID effects. PPP loans
were also essential in making decisions to waive payments. Businesses that received the capital
injection were more likely to have the cash to cover expense and survive closures and cash flow
losses; therefore, the lender’s confidence in the loan and the borrower increased.
The accommodations made for these chosen companies varied on a case-by-case basis.
Most of these changes included a payment plan with close monitoring of credit card receipts.
These payment plans were negotiated with the borrower to determine the best plan for payments
on past loans and new loans to cover costs during the crisis. The payment plans included
extended maturities to original loans and reduced present payment requirements. The rates of
these loans remained relatively low due to government intervention in interest rates; the
companies with new payment plans received these lower rates despite the extra COVID risk and
deferred payments of their pre-existing loans.
The other atypical asset class was commodities. This asset was unique due to the nature
of the limited exposure it had to COVID complications. According to the respondent, the number
of accommodations needed for these businesses was limited and not necessarily an atypical
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amount compared to their typical requests. For this reason, the accommodations were treated
with high scrutiny and required significant due diligence to ensure the needs of the business were
exclusively from COVID factors. The lender was more concerned with investigating poorly
managed businesses and only allowed accommodations to specifically COVID affected
borrowers. These loans were unique as they had similarly small maturity times as the fintech
loans described above. These loans typically matured in 60 to 90 days and acted as more of a line
of credit than a typical term loan. They are often renewed after every period based on the needs
of the borrower. For the COVID affected borrowers, deferrals were offered without penalties and
fees, however, as mentioned they were not given out lightly due to the nature of the effect of
COVID on the asset class. Often, these accommodations did require the bank to add a small
increase in the interest rate to adjust for the added risk of the loan changes. This increase in
interest rate was considered lenient compared to normal adjustments if covenant violations or
payment defaults occur.
Overall, the exploration of tactics used from lender to lender and among various assets
demonstrated that the best system and solutions for borrowers during COVID was not uniform.
Lenders were able to take the needs of their borrower base and meet them in a way that was
necessary for the cooperation required for the loan portfolios.
Comparison to 2008
It was common for the responder to compare the COVID situation to the 2008 financial
crisis. Although these two financial crises have extremely different origins, the comparison can
bring context to the changed behavior between lenders and borrowers.
During the 2008 crisis, the closest comparison to the current PPP program was the TARP
program. Through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the TARP program was
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meant to improve the stabilities of the market, banks, and the auto industry. The funds purchased
the equity of distress business and issued loans. TARP created thirteen programs that allowed the
government to use these funds in various areas of the market (CITE). The money was injected
into the banks and large businesses directly. The hope was to free up the movement of money in
the market and allow banks to continue to lend to everyday people and small businesses. The
PPP program of 2020 took a very different approach to freeing up lending in the overall market.
Instead of focusing on getting money to small businesses through the banks and the markets, the
government took a more direct approach with this program. They brought the lending relief to
these businesses to ensure the money would get where it was needed the most.
In addition to the method of injecting cash into the economy, the overall policies of both
the banks and the government changed from the 2008 crisis to the COVID crisis. According to
the responses, the 2008 crisis was not a time of government leniency and forgiveness. This lack
of leniency waterfalled through the supply chain of capital causing banks to restrict their lending
capabilities and cut of non-preforming loans. When businesses could not pay their debt due to
the overall effects of the housing crisis, many banks tightened up their processes of approving
accommodations. Several respondents indicated they forced many of these loans into nonperforming status and increase the penalties and costs associated with any changes made to debt
contracts. In some cases, the loan was quickly liquidated to get some value back into the bank.
Based on previous literature, these changes made to contracts had longer term effects on smaller
businesses abilities to engage in investments for growth in their companies. In contrast, the
COVID crisis took a different approach to credit. As described above, the government and
lenders took on a policy of leniency with credit risk and loan mark downs allowing the evasion
of TDR status for many of these non-performing loans. Instead of restricting accommodations
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and further lending capabilities, lenders helped businesses manage their distressed situation by
offering relief with deferral plans and sometimes additional loans. Businesses were able to
sustain their basic costs and make it through the crisis with this cooperation returning to some
normalcy as various industries recovered. It is clear the government and lenders’ change in
tactics helped to create an environment for struggling businesses to succeed in making through
the crisis.
CONCLUSION
National COVID closures created mass panic for small and private businesses around the
country. Without cash flows, many owners feared they would be cut off from their credit source
and forced to close. However, after interviewing nine different executive credit officers from
lenders of various sizes around the country, it was clear that the small, private business credit
market was able to adapt to the situation and prevent what could have been a massive hit to the
United States overall GDP and employment. Lenders and borrowers worked together to create
payment plan deferrals to account for the lack of cash flow that prevented many companies from
servicing their debt in the short term. Through various systems and structural changes, lenders
assisted their borrowers directly affected by COVID efficiently and effectively, giving many
businesses the tools and resource to survive. The number of loan losses were significantly less
than expected and almost all industries were able to recover from the initial shock of COVID.
With the support of the government, banks and lending platforms were able to provide relatively
cost-free accommodations to their borrowers in need. Overall, the changing behavior towards
cooperation between these lenders and their borrower was seen as positive and helpful in
preventing lasting damage to the economy.
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